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a-constitutional provision. CRose v.State
Cali/ornia,-19
Ca1.2d713 [123 P.2d 505].) What it intended was to requIre
a redemptioner to pay taxes on property redeemed \\The.rEi the
taxes were not assessed because title was vested' in. the state
as the result of a sale to the state for'deUllquent taxes, Such
property is not ina strict sense exempt from taxaticin,. but its
assessment for the purpose of taxation is suspended during'
the time that title is held by the state as the repository of
.titles" derived from delinquent tax sales.
. In my opinion, the exemption provided for
the Constitutiott is of a permanent nature and if property is once. exempted ahdno taxes are assessed against it because of. such
ex;emptlon, it cannot' thereafter be. assessed for the sameperiocl
it was declared to be exempt by the Constitution. Therefore,
if the property in question was exempt from taxation while
the title thereto was vested in the reclamation diStrict; it did
not become subject to taxation during that period after title
thereto was acquired by petitioner, and petitioner is therefore
entitled to the writ prayed for.

t
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~

m

Shenk, J., concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing. was denied May 6,
1943. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a
rehearing.

[!?

F. No. 16609. In Bank.

Apr. 7,.1943.]

JOHN FRANKLIN DARE, Appellant, v. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et a1., Respondents.
[1] Certiorari -

Acts Reviewable - Acts' of Nongovernmental
Boards.-Certiorari is not an appropriate method of reviewing the action of a hoard not exercising judicial functions.
[2] Administrative Law-Mandamus.-A citizen feeling aggrieved
because the action of an administrative board not exercising
McK. Dig. References: [1] Certiorari, § 45; [2,3,5-11] Administrativ.e Law; [4] Mandamus, § 2; [12, 13] Physicians and Sur~
geons, § 19.

II
I

Apr. 1943]

DAREV.

Bn.

OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
[21 C'.2d ·790]

.

judicial.functions will have th~effect of deprivinghini. ~f a ~
·constitutional right may have the action reviewed in a maD"
damus proceeding, wherein the court,. not being co~fined., to
the record before the board,. may' exercise an independent
'
judgment on all evidence before it,
[3a, Sb] ld.-Mandamus-Trial .De Novo;-Evidence~Record of '
Evidence ..,-In a mandamus proceeding to review the ac~ion
of an administrative board, the record of the evidence before
the board is competent and should be considered with oth.er
evidence in the cause. If the respond.ent dOes. not include
· the. record as part of'its return to the alternative writ, he
should have it available at the triatIf the 'petitionerprevailing in the case had to produce it at hill own expense, he
.may recover therefor by way of damages pursuant to Code
· Cfv.Proc., § 1095.
. .
[4] Mandamus-Nature.-Equitable principles are applicable in
a mandamus proceeding.
[6] Administrative Law-Mandamus--Trial De Novo-:..Nature.In a mandamus proceeding to review the action of an administrative board, the trial de novo is not unqualified or unlimited like that .on appeal from a justice's court,' and is not
governed by the rules applicable to the review of the. action
of the Board of Governors of The State Bar. But the trial
is governed by Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1084-1097. •
. [6a, 6b] ld.-Mandamus--'Trial De Novo-Scope.-One charged'
with violating the provisions of his professional license may
not remain silent before the administrative board, or present
a so-called "skeleton" showing, and thereafter secure in court
a trial de novo in an unlimited sense.
[7] ld.-Mandamus-Trial De NQvo-Evidence-EVidence Before
Board.-In a mandamus proceeding to review the action of an
administrative board, it is not contemplated that there be a
reiteration of the evidence presented to the board and contained in its record.
[8] ld.-Mandamus-Trial. De Novo-Evidence.-In a mandamus
proceeding to review the action of an administrative board,
the complaining party may object to incompetent evidence rec.eived by the board and offer evidence improperly excluded.
And additional evidence maybe received on a showing that,
in the exercise of reasonable diligence, it cot!Id not have been
introduced before the board.

[9] ld.-Mandamus-Trial De Novo-Witnesses-Impeachment.-In a mandamus proceeding to .review the action of an adinin...

[5] See 42 Am.Jur. 662.
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istrative board, witnesses before the board whose credibility
is questioned may be further examined, contradicted or impeached.
[10] Id...;...,.Mandamus~Petition.'"-In a mandamus proceeding to
review the action of an 'administrative board, the petition
should set forth any objections to proceedings before the
board which are to be questioned at the trial.

[111 ld.-Mandamus-Trial De Novo-Findings and Judgment.--:-:a mandamus proceeding to review the action of an administrative board, the findings aild order of the board have not
the finality ofa court judgment. Although. no new .evidence
is received, the court can make findings . and conclusions, and
render a judgment either granting or denying relief.
[12] Physicians-Revocation of License-Unprofessional Conduct
-Use ofSuffi.,xN. D.-A drugless practitioner not licensed to'
practille .naturopathy may not use the letters N.:J. (meaning
doctor of.naturopathy) as a suffix after his name, and if he
does so he is guilty' of' unprofessional conduct.
[13] ld.-Revocation of License-Use of' Title "Doctor" or Prefix
"Dr."-Bus. and Prof. Code,§ 2409, declaring the unauthorized use of the title "doctor" or prefix ·"Dr." constitutes unprofessional ~onduct, is constitutional.

rn

APPEAL· from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
. City and County of San Francisco. Sylvairt J. Lazarus,
,Judge. Affirmed.
,Proceeding in mandamus to compel restoration of the license of drugless practitioner. Judgment denying writ affirmed.
M. J as. McGranaghan for Appellant.
Earl Warren, Attorney General, and Thomas Coakley, Deputy Attorney General; for Respondents.
SHENK, J.-This is a proceeding in mandamus to compel
the respondents, Board of Medical Examiners and its members to cancel the order of the board reVOking the petitioner's
license to practice as a drugless practitioner, and to restore
or re-issue his license. The petition was filed in the superior
court. An, alternative' writ was issued. The respondents
filed an Il.nswer and the cause was set down for trial. Upon
the- trial judgment was entered denying the peremptory wdt.
The' petitioner has' appealed from that judgment.
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The petitioner alleged that he was licensed asa drugless
practitioner under a certificate issued by the Board. of M~di
cal Examiners; that he also was licensed to practIce chiropractic under the provisions of' the Chiropractic Act; that
he also held a certificate as a clinical laboratory technologist;
that in May, 1940, he was charged, by the board With displaying a sign using the prefix" Dr. " without eXpressly in<licating the type. of certificate held, and that, inasmuch as
he did not hold a physician's and surgeon's certificate issued
by the board, his act was in violation, of the Business and
Professions Code (sec. 2409) ; that he ,filed an answerm the
proceedings before the board and that thereafter a hearing
was bad resulting in the order complained of. TJJ,e petitioner
purported to state a resume of the oral" documentary and.
photographic evidence taken at the hearing before the board,
including his own testimony. It was alleged that the board
failed to produce any evidence that the use of the suffix
"N.D.," assuming that it was so used, constituted unprofessional conduct, or that it tended to, mislead the ptiblic.
It was then alleged that the board found the petitioner guilty
as charged -and ordered that his license as a drugless practitionerbe revoked unless he, would agree not to use any
form of advertising except the words "drugless practitioner~'
on his professional card, in' which ~ase his license wouid be "
restored and he would be placed on five years 'probation';
that similar action was taken as to each of. the ,charges; arid
that "said order has no support whatsoever under tlietesti-.
mony and evidence submitted to and received by defendant
Board."
.A short time prior to the hearing before the board, the Dis~
trict Court of Appeal had rendered an, opiliionin the case
of Laime v. State Board of Optometry, (Cal.App.) (102
P.2d538]. However, at the time of the trial in the $'uperior
court, a petition for hearing in that case had been' granted
and the cause was then pending in this/ court. At the conimencement of the trial the court inquired about the record
of the proceedings before the board. Counsel, for' the .petitioner stated that, regardless of what took place before the
board, he was demanding' a trial de novo in the sense' ot a
re-trial of the issues involved in the controversy; that he had
no intention of producing that record before the court; that
he felt that he was not bound by that record and' that he
' participated in the hearing before the board on that theory;

./

";',.'

,
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and that he would "not stipulate to the introduction of the
evidence taken before the board, or the rulings made before
the board." When admonished by the court that he was
"taking an awful chance" in assuming such an attitude counsel nevertheless insisted upon his demand for a trial anew
without qualification or limitation. No offer of proof was
made.
On this appeal it is likewise contended by ,the petitioner
that he was entitled to proceed as on a new trial of the issues
of fact without the production of the record of' the evidence
before the board and without any limitation or qualification
becaUse of this court ' '1 declarations in the caSe of Drummey
v. State Board of Funeral Directors, 13 Ca1.2d75 [87 P.2d
848], and in the case of Laisne v. State Board 0/ Optometry,
19 Ca1.2d 831 [123 P.2d4{>7], decided since the hearing in
the superior court, to the effect that in the proceeding in
court to, question the action of such a board the court is not
confined to the record before the board and that the petitioner is entitled to a hearing in the nature of a trial de novo
on the issues presented.
The petitioner, may not now contend that he was not accorded the ,right to qllestion the sufficiency of the record before the board, if it had been produced, or was not accorded
the right to introduce, evidence before the court substantially
in accordance with the procedure herein outlined. The record
shows that the court offered him such an opportunity but he
declined to so proceed on the ground that he was entitled
to a trial anew without the introduction of the record before
'
the board.
Prior to the present proceeding the propriety of producing in court and there considering the record of the proceedings before the board had not been questioned. That
question is now presented to this court for the first time.
The extent of the independent judgment to be exercised by
the court in the mandamus proceeding is also pertinent to
the discussion and to the determination of the appeal.
,[1] The discussion has centered first on the nature of the
remedy available to one aggrieved by the order of such a
bo~rd, and secondly on the scope of that remedy. This court
has held in numerous cases that such a board does not and
cannot exercise judicial functions unless authorized so to do by
the Constitution. A few of the more recent cases are Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 6 Ca1.2d 557
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[59 P.2d 119] ; Whitten v. State B(jar~ of Optometry" 8Qal.
2d 444. [65 P.2d 1296, 115 A.L.R. 1] ;'Drummeyv;, StiJ,t'e
Board. of Funeral Directors, supra; Laisne·v. Stale Board "of'
Optometry, supra. It followed necessarily, tha:t certiorari:
was not the appropriate method of reviewilig the ,action ~of
such a board. [2] Since no other legal ,remedy, was ma.de
available this court declared and has 'adheredto:tliepropa~'
sition that a citiien, feeling aggrievedbecause'of' the.action'
of such a board, which if, undisturbed would have the' effect
of depriving him of aconstitutiona1'righ~ eithet:Ofliberty
or property, should be entitl~dto have thevalidity'ofthat
action inquired into in a court of justice ; that the proper
method of inquiring into the propriety' of the oflicifil acts of
such a board is by means of a mandamus proceedj.ng,' and
that in such a proceeding the court is not confined· to the
. record before· the board but may exercise an independei'lt
judgment on all of the competent evidence before it.
'
[3a] Because the hearing to which the petitioner was en. titled was said to be in the natilre of a trial de novo,' it is
contended that the record of the evidence before.,
board
had no proper place in the evidence at the trial. ' There is no
merit in the contention. The significance of the trial designated as a trial de novo must be tested in the light of the
nature and scope of the remedy in mandamus' thus made
available. [4] In its nature mandamus is a proce~ding in
which equitable principles are applicable. (Lukens v. l!lye,
156 Cal. 498, 507 [105 P. 593, 20 Ann.Cas. 158, 36 L.R.A.
N.S. 244] j Hutchison v. Reclamation Dist., 81 Ca1.App. 427,
433 [254P. 606]; Dierssen v. Oivil Bervice Oommission, 43
Cal.~pp.2d 53, 57 [110 P.2d 513].)
[lS] The scope of~uc.b
a trIal is not to be deemed to be the unqu.alified or unlimited
trial' de novo to which a litigant is entitled.in the superior
court on appeal from a justice's court on questions of fact
or on questions of both law and fact (Code 'Civ. Proc., sec.
976), where, justifiably or not, he may present a "skeleton"
case in the lower court and reserve the real showing on the
merits for the trial in the superior court. And such a trial
is not governed, by the rules applicable to the statutorY teview of the action of the :Board of Governors of The State
Bar in which this court exercises an independElllt, judgment
solely on the facts contained in the reeord before that board.
The conditions attending the trial in the consideration and

the
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determination of the mandamus proceedjngs ~ay be said
to include the following:
First, the petitioner comes before the court governed by
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to
mandamus proceedings (Code Civ. Proc., secs. 1084 to 1097
inclusive). In the disposition of such proceedings the court
is likewise governed by those code sections. The powers and
duties of the court in the premises are provided for therein.
Historically the writ of mandamus was devised to provide a
remedy where no {)ther remedy existed. Its purpose was to
afford a means of procuring justice in the proper field of its
oper!1tion where there was an asserted'legal right and no
specIfic legal remedy for the enforcement of that right. The
code provides (sec. 1085) that the writ "may be issued by
any court, except a municipal, justice's or police court to
any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, o,r person, to c~m
pel the perform~nce of an act which the law specially enjoins,
as a duty resultmg from an office, trust or station; or to comp.el the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a
nght or office to which he is entitled, and from which he is
unlawfully precluded by such inferior tribunal, corporation,
board Or person."
Section 1086 provides: "The writ must be issued in all
?ases wher~ there is not a plain; speedy; and adequate remedy,
In ~he ordlI~,a.ry course of law. It mlist be issued up on the
verIfied petItIon of the party beneficially interested."
Provision is then made for the issuance of an alternative
and a peremptory writ (sec. 1087). "When the application
to the ~o~rt is made' without, Iloti?e to the adverse party, and
the wrIt IS allowed, the alternatIve [writ] must be first issued.... " (Sec. 1088.)
Fro.m an early date in this state, as noted in the Drummey
cas", It has been held that, where no other remedy is available,. mandamus is th.e pro~er remedy, for one improperly
deprIved of a pl:'OfesslOnal lIcense by a state-wide adminis~rative board, to secure the rest()ration of· his license. Such
~s .~epurpose of the present proceeding. The proceeding is
~D.ltIated by the fili~~ of a verified petition. The practice
'lStopresent the petItIon to the court with a request that the
alt~rhative writ be issued ex parte. But a petitioner is not
entItled as a matter of right to the issuance of that writ.
He must make a proper showing by the allegations of his
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petition. ,If his petition failS to state a primafallie case en~
titlinghim'i:o the issuance of the alternative writ, itis within
the power of the court to deny it out of hand. This is familiar ',' practice in all courts having {)riginal' jurisdiction fu
mandamus. Furthermore, the power, ,of the court is not with-.
out ,a discretion, wisely exercised, to g~an~ or deny either
the alternative or the peremptory writ. (Wiedwald v.Dod.,
son, 95 Oal. 450 [30 P. 580]; Betty v; Superior Oourl,18 Cal.2d:
619 [116 P.2d 947] ; Bartholomae Oil Oorp~ .Y.,Superior Oou.r:t,
18Cal.2d 726 [117 P.2d 674] ~r For anablise of this diseretion
on the part of a lower .court 'appropriate remeaial!' area.vail~..
able in a' higher COU1:t, unless the' pr<?ceeding ,~' etiterta~ed:
originally in the Supreme Court,wherean order denying
writ is not generally reviewable except on 'a petltionfor reo
hearing.
',.
Second: If the alternative
is issued it may, be said '
that the matter then proceeds as an ordinary civil action;
But this is not so in some ipIportant particulars. The requirements of the alternative writ are, that. the respondent,
do the act demanded or show cause at a speCIfied time and
place why he has not done so. In the event of nOIi-ccimpliance
the order then is in the nature of an order to show 'cause
where the burden is cast upon the respondent to proceed and
show to the satisfaction of. the court why he has Iiotperformed the act demanded by the petitioner. Oii the ,ret\lrn
day, in original proceedings in the Supreme Court and District Courts of Appeal, the rule is th,at "the respondent
may make return, either by demurrer or by answer,or by,
both. If the return be by demurrer alone,and the demurrer
is not sustained, the [peremptory] writ may 'be ordered ,to
issue without leave to answer, over.'.' (Rule
sec. a,
of Rules· for the Supreme Court.),
.th~ su:i;erio~ c,ourt,
on the return of the alternative writ, the respondent may file
an answer \lnder oath (sec.1089), in which questions of law
also may be raised (sec. 1094) .. But the petitioneris,:not
preCluded by the answer from' any .valid objection, to its ·s1l.fiiciency (sec. 1092).
'.
"
Third: When the matter is at issue on c~ntro.verted· .ques- tion&. of filet, the caU:se may then be said to pro~c~d;as'a civil
action,' that is, it is set down for trial ahdis trledlisacivil
ac~ion during the course of which' any competente-riden~e
may be introduced and received and the ordinary procedlithl

the
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'iw.es apply. At the close of the hearing the court makes
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and enters judgment
,
'either deny-ingor granting aperemptory writ.
, Fourth: In the course of the trial questions may arise as
to the admissibility of o:IIered evidence, [3b] The present
case is illustrative of those where the admissibility and e:IIect
of ,the record of the evidence before the board is brought
into question. None of the cases has specifically declared that
such a record is admissible, obviously for the reason that it
had been the practice to receive it and its admissibility' had
'not. been questioned. The cases have therefore assumed that
it would ~e admissible. It was stated in the Drummey and
in the Laisne' cases that the court is not· confined to the record
'of' the eviden~ before the board. If' the record were not
'in eVidence that 'state~ent 'would be without significance;
The admissibility'of the record before the board has, been
assUnied 'for the further reason thaf such a record is ordinarily essential to the proper determination by the cqur1: of
, the question whether the respondent has, perform'iJd ita official
·dutYin the premises. This is especiaUy true where the issues
turn upon <l~estions of fact. The court may refuse to proceed in a proper case unless the record before the board is
produced in' court. The problem may arise as to who should
present that record.' Norn'tallythe respondimthasorshould
have it prepared as a' part of its records and include it as
a part of 'its return to the alternative writ. If not produced
until during the course, of' the trial, the respondent should
have it available for, the benefit of the court at that time.
If the petitioner is 'required to produce it at his own experise
the court, ill the event the petitioner prevails, is authorized
to impose the expense of preparing it by way of damages pursuant to section 1095 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Fifth: ,As stated the court is not confined to the record of
the proceedings before the board. That is but another way
of saying that the court may decide the cause on all .of the
competent evidence before it; which is a truism. Since the
record before the board is competent evidence it should be
considered and weighed along with other, evidence in the
cause.
It was said in the Drummey case that "the findings of .
the board come before the court with a strong presumption of
their correctness." If there is no requirement for formal

findIng-sand none are made, findings in favor ofthe prevail-.
ing party are 5mplied from the determination o:{ the board.
In any event the entire record is a public record,-that is; it
is-'the record of the proceedings of, a legally constituted. public body. ,It may be assumed that in, the ordinary case such
a record would disclose that the controversy between· the part~
ties had< been ,tried out before the board' as faIrly 'andcom~,
pletely as the circumstances, or the case would, 'permit.
[6a] There is nothing ,in any of the cases. to jU$tify the
-conclusion that one charged with violating the-conditions of
, his, professional license, may remain siient, before:, the: board'
or present a so-called cc skeleton" showing· and '~ihe~eafter'
,secure in court a trial de novO" hi an unliinited ,sense.
[7] Nor was it ever contemplated that ,the tune/of' the' court
should be consumed in a reiteration of the, .competent evidericepresented to the board 'and contained in the record of
its proceedings. (Sparks v. Boa~d of DentatExaminers,
54 ,Cal.App.2d 491 [129 P;2d 405].) . [6b] . If the record
befo~e, ,the hoard should disclose that, the' petifionerh~d 'intentIOnally presented a "skeleton" defense' in the hearinO'
before the board for the obyiouspurpose Of transferring th:'
contr.oversy from the board to the court,'that fact should weigh
heavilyag:ainst him in his endeayor to invoke the ,equity powers
of the court in his behalf in the mandamus proceeding. If
llOwever, it appears that the controversy has been tried out ~
good faith before the board thereis rio reason why the time of
the court should be takenup,or the partie~be put to additional
expense in, duplicating the record before the bO\1rd.
[8] Sixth: As above noted the trial court is not confined
to the record before the board. Nor is the -court bound hy the
findings and determinations of the board. It must also be said
that neither party is necessarily bound in all particulars by the
record before the' board. If it should appear .from that record
that incompetent evidence had been received by the board the
complainmg party should not be foreclosed.from objectin~ on
the trial to its admissibility. Also if the hoard had improperly
refused to entertain admissible evidence the litigant should not
be foreclosed from o:IIering it at the trial. If additional evidence
not included in either category pe'sought to be introduced by
a party, the court has the right to receive it upon a showing
that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, it could tlot'have
been introduced hefore the board: [9] If the cr~dibility of

, ,-.;'

'"

80Q

DARE
.

.'

V. BD. OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS

[21 C.2d

Apr. 1943J

DARE

v. Bn.

OF MEDIOAL ExAMINERS
[21 C.2c1.790]

801

.

witnesses before the board be brought in question in the man·
damus<proceeding the opportiulity should be afforded for fur.
ther examination or to contradict or impeach their testimony
under well i:ecogniZed rules of evidence and procedure. [10] If
the proceedings bef()re the board are to be q'uestioned at" the
triul it would be the duty of the petitioner to set forth hisob·
jections in the petition fQr the writ.
Finally, 'research discloses that there is nothing novel in
denominating the hearing in the mandamus proceeding atrial
"de novo j " or in placing obviously reasonable limitations
upon its general scope' at the hearing. The term has been accorded various meanings elsewhere, depending on the purpose
of the legislation, or the rules·of procedure .. For example, in
ndmiralty "An appeal.. . vacates the decree of the lower
court and there is a trial de novo in the appellate court. Thus,
on· appeal from the district court to the circuit court· of up. peals; the proceeding or the. trial de novo is on the record on
appeal, and on such new or amended pleadings, or such new
evidence as the circuit court of appeals may allow or admit."
(2 C.J.S., p.318, citing authorities.) In Shttpee v. Railroad
Oommission of Texas, 123 Tex. 521 [73 S:W.2d 505], the
statute provided for a court action by one aggrieved by the
commissionfs decision which should "be tried and determined
as other civil causes." 1t also provided that the plaintiff had
the burden of showing "by the preponderance of evidence"
that the. decision was unreasonable or unjust as to him. In
that case in arriving at its conclusion that the commission's
denial of the plaintiff's application for a certificate of convenience and necessity should not be disturbed the court frequently referred to the evidence adduced before the commission. It may be said that the statute there contemplated a
"trial de novo." Nevertheless the court held that the legislative intent was that the commission's decision was not to be
disturbed unless it had no basis in fact and was arbitrary and
capricious; that the court should not .substitute its judgme~t
for that of the commission, unless it was shown that the judg·
ment of the commission was without foundation in fact, or
was unreasonable or arbitrary. Likewise in Texas Liquor
Oontrol Board v. Floyd, (Tex.Civ.App.) 117S.W.2d 530, 534,
we find the statement:" The de novo· hearing before the district court, as provided in the. Act, does not mean that the
issue of whether or not a permittee's license shall be can.
celled is' to be heard and determined anew by the court in th&

same manner as if no hearing had been had by the' Board or·
its administrator>"
.
The foregoing cases. are refe~ed. to ~or the putpose of'
"illustratin.g that judicial trial de novo . after an admin~trative
hearing is not usually intended as a trial without appropriate
consideration of the evidence upon wh~ch thead:ministr~tive'
body based its action. All of the decisions recogni2ethejm~.
portant administrative functioni of such a board ~ utili~g.,
its fiicilities· in initiating and investigating disciplinary "prO.proceedings, conducting hearings, :finding the. facts. and .
makingits.orders accordingly; (See Whitten v: State BO,ard
of Opt(imetry, SCa1.2d 444, 446 [65 P·.2d 1296; 115 A~L.R..l].)
.[11] Those findings and orders have, not the .ftnalityof ~
colirt judgment if attacked in an appropriate· courtl'roceedings, such as In mandamuS. If in such a proceeding it appear~
that. there' ,vas no breach of. duty. in the matter .of receiving
or refusing to receive evidence; that there is not ot:h~r .perti~
nentevidence which the trialco'Urt, in the,.exercise of a wise
discretion, Should receive, or that such other evidence should
be and has been received, then the court has the po~er,to
make :itsfindings of fact and conclusions of law. and render
judim,ent either denying the relietso:nghtor by,~n ,appropriate 'writ directing the board to perform its official duty in the
'.
premises.
..
.
The record .herein shows that the petitioner. drafted· the
allegations. of his petition in line with the foregoing: views and
procedure. To support those allegations. the intr6d~ction' of
the record of the proceedings before the board would have
been not only proper, but necessary.. However, the petitioner
refused sO to proceed. In effect, he refused to participate in
the trial on the issues of fact if the record before the board
was required' to be produced.
. .'
The attitude thus taken by the petitioner left nothing for
the trial court to decide except the issues of law involved.
Those questions· were, argued 'and' the· cause was subIriitted,
thereon. About three weeks later the courtdeternnned those
issues adversely to the contentions of the petitioner, and we
think correctly.
[12] There is no merit in the contention that the complaint before the board did not state a cause for disciplinary
action against the petitioner.. In this connection the petitioner
contended at the trial and now contends that he was entitled
to use the letters "N.D.," meanin~ Doctor of NatUropathy,
:UC.2c1-28
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so he asserts, the methods of treatment of the sick
by a drugless practitioner and by a naturopath are the same,
and that the public was not prejudiced thereby. He concedes
that he was not licensed to practice naturopathy in this state.'
Section 2395 of the Business and Professions Code provides
that the use by the holder of any certificate of any letters,
suffix, indicatiIig that he is entitled to practice a system or
mode of treating the sick for which he is not licensed in this
state constitutes unprofessional conduct. In 1909 (Stats.
1909, p. 418), the Legislature in effect ratified certificates to
practice naturopathy theretofore issued by the Association of
Naturopaths of California; but the act did not authorize any
future' issuance of such certificates and none have since been
issued. There is no rule by which a person authorized to
practice as a drugless practitioner under the appropriate and
revised system (Stats. 1913, p. 722), may successfully claim
privileges under an earlier and discontinued system. By section 2395 the Legislature forbade it, and the contention may
not prevail that the. Legislature could not lawfully do so, or
that the restriction adopted was not appropriate to protect
the public against deception. [Ia] The same conclusion follows a consideration of the petitioner's contention that section 2409 of the Business and Professions Code adopted in
1939 is unconstitutional because it is class legislation. That
section provides: "Unless a person licensed and authorized
under _this chapter or any preceding medical practice act to
use the title 'doctor' or the letters or prefix 'Dr.,' holds a
physician and surgeon's certificate, the use of this title or
tliese letters or prefix without further indicating' the type of
certificate he .holds, constitutes unprofessional conduct within the meaning of this chapter." The petitioner has failed to
show wherein the distinction· thus provided is unreasonable
and beyond the power the Legislature to afford protection
.against misleading the public. An even more severe restriction was upheld in Davis v. State Board of Optometry, 83 Cal.
App.488 [257 P. 197]. (See also State v. Michaels, 226 Wis.
574 [277 U.W. 157] ;.State v. Pollman, 51 Wash. 110· [98
P. 88].)
In view of the state of the record here presented it follows
that the trial court had no recourse but to deny the peremptory writ.
The judgment is affirmed.
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. TRAYNOR, J. Concurring and Dissenting.-The.present
case, together with Russellv. Miller, post, p. 817 [136
P.2d 318], is the latest step in the development of a new system of judicial review of the decisions of state-wide administrativeboards. The earlier cases (Standard Oil 00. of Oalifornia v. State Board of Equalization, 6 Ca1.2d 557 [59 P.
119] ; Whitten v. State Board of Optometry, 8 Ca1.2d 444 [65
P.2d 1296, 115 A.L.R.1] ; Drummey.v. State Board of FuneraZ
Directors, 13 Cal.2d 75 [87 P.2d 848] ; McDonough v. Goodc~ll,
13 Ca1.2d 741 [91 P.2d 1035, 123 A..L.R. 1205] ; Laisne v. State
Board of Optometry, 19Ca1.2d 831 [123 P.2d 457]) have been
comprehensively analyzed elsewhere and their weaknesses exposed. (McGovney, Administrative Decisions .and Oourt Review Thereof, In Oalifornia, 29 Cal.L.Rev. 110 ;,McGovney,
Th~ Oalifornia Chaos in Oourt Review of the Decisions of
State Administrative Agencies, 15 So.Cal.L:Rev. 391; Rode;
Administrative AdjUdication in (Jalifornia and Its R'eviewby
the Writ of Oertiorari, 25 Cal.L.Rev. 694; Turrentine, Restore Certiorari to Review State-Wide Administrat'tve Bodies
in Oalifornia, 29' Cal.L.Rev. 275; Turrentine, The 'LaisrJ,e
Oase-A Strange Ohapter in Our Jurisprudenc~,17 State
Bar Journal, 165; Elliott, Oertiorari and the Loea.lBoard,
29 Cal.L.Rev. 586.) When the majority of the court in Laisne .
v. State Board of Optometry, supra, held that if the order of
an administrative board revoking a license "is questioned in
a court ,of law, then under the' Constitution. 6f this 'state' the
petitioner must be given a trial de novo on the issues' involved "
(19 Cal.2d 831, 845) it was generally assuiiledthat they
meant what the Latin term expresses, a new trial .of the matterall over again. The author of the majority opinion 'himself ,
so defined it in his opinion inOollier &7 Wallis.v: Asto{9
Cal.2d 202, 205 [70 P.2d 171], and the disslllltiiig:ophiion
in the Laisne case assumed that this definition c'ontinued' to
hold firm, without provoking either its repudiation',dr, quali~ .
fication in the majority opinion. It is now. clear, howeyer, that
such a trial is no longer contemplated. The complainingparly
finds that he is entitled,not to a: trial de novo, hutto a "review" of the action of the board "in the nature of a.trial de.
novo. " This review by a proceeding in mandamllS has many
characteristics of certiorari, some characteristics of amotion
for new trial, but few if any characteristics' of mandamus; '.
The new procedure resembles certiorari in the following •
particulars:

'..
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.(1) The record of the proceedings before the. board is not
only admitted in evidence but is "ordinarily essential to the
proper determination by the court of the question whetheJr
the respondent has performed its official duty in the premises." Thi'3 definition of the cOlirt's function aptly describes
a proceeding in certiorari ( compare Code Oiv.· Proc .. sec.
1074), but is foreign to the traditional conception of a proceeding to eompe1 the performance of a duty prescribed by
law, for example the duty of an administrative board to take
jurisdiction. and render a decision. Mandamus does not. normally· extend to the revision or dictation. of the administrative decision. (CaL Code Civ.Proc. sec. 1085; McGovney,
op. cit. 29 Cal.L.Rev. 110, 149.)
(2) The l'espondent is required to produce the record. If
·the proceeding' were in certiorari instead of mandamus it
would be governed by section 1011 of the Code of' Civil Procedure, providing that the writ specify that the· one to whom
it 'is 'directed must produce a transcript of the record and
proceedings at a given time and place. The majority of the
court have precluded themselves from invoking section 1071
only to find themselves compelled to formumte its equivalent:
" The problem may arise as to who should present t.hat record.
Normally the respondent has or should have it prepared as
a part of its records and include it as a part of its return. to
the alternative writ. 'If not produced until during thecoursP.
of the trial, the respondent should have it available for the
benefit of the court at that time; If the petitioner is required
to produce it at his own expense the court, in the event the
petitioner prevails, is authorized to impose the expense of
preparing it by way of damages pursuant to section 1095 of
the Code of Civil Procedure." Something is lost by language
· that does not specifr the person who must produce the record,
and that raises any doubt as to when it should be produced.·
(3) The trial court may review the record as it would on
certiorarI. In the view of the majority opinion it is the function of the trial court to exercise its discretion to grant or
deny either the alternative or peremptory writ of mandamus,
and the function of the appellate court to determine whether
the trial court has abuSed its discretion. The majority opin~
· ion in fact looks to the trial court to exercise its discretion
so as to obviate unnecessary retrials in the court. It is anticipated that" in the ordinary case such a record would· disclose
• that the controversy between the parties had been tried out
before the board as fairly and completely as the circumstances
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of the cas.e would permit." Criticism .0f'theLaiSlle case'. has
been taken to heart in the words: "It was never contemplated
that the time of the court should beconstuned.m ar~itera~
tion .of the competent evidence presented to the .Q9ard.Jind
contained in the record of its proceedirigs. . .: If, it .appear$
that the controversy has been tried out in good' faith' before.,'
the board there is no reason why the tiine' of the, coUrishoUld •
be tak.eri up or the parties put to additional expense in dupli:, .
cating the record before the board."
.
. ."
In an actu8.l certiorari proceeding, the court would 'be con;.
fined to the record of the proceedings before the::adminIstra~ .
tive board" and the board's determinatioriwould 'he' qua-shed
if the record disclosed that the board had Mt'ed, 'outside its
jurisdiction, or had made serious errors of law in,:the;ex~rcis~
thereof, or that its decision was not supported by'~bstantia~
evidence. Under the system devised bYthemaj~rity,.ho"'VV
ever, the record is considered and weighed along wi.~h, pther
evidence, a. procedure unknown to the common law.. The rule
¢~bodiedin section 1870(8) of the Code of CivilProcedllre
is that ifa witness is deceased, or out of the juriSdiction, or
unable to testify, his testimony giveq in a former Action bE)tween tb,eparties, relating to the samemattez:maybe.admitted
II pon another trial. "The report of the. official reporter. :or
offi_cial reporter pro tempore~ of any ~ourt,dillyappoii:lted
.and sworn, wheri transcribed and certified as bemg a, correct
transcript of the, testinionyand proceedings in the case is
prima facie evidence of such testimony and proceedings. H
(Code Civ. Proc. sec 273.) There is no comparable provision
with respect to administrative determinations. .
The majority opinion makes new evidence' adinissible in
the following circumstances.
(1), "I:Ut Should appear from the record thatincompetent •
evidence had been received by the board the ,cQmi>~l1h:tmg
. party sl10uld not, be foreclosed from objecting ·onth,e. trial t.6
its admissibi"Jity:" The majority opinion does riot inake clear'
by what rules the conipetencyof theevidenc~ is to b~ deter:mined, or whether objection to its adniission inuSt. bem:ade at
the board hearing. Under established':pl'ecedents~dIn.inistra
tive boards are not required to follow thecommorilawrul~s
of evidence, even when the statutes governing their procedure
are silent'm this regard. (Wigmore, Evidence, (3rd·ed.) vol..
1, secs. 4b-4c; pp. 27-95; Stephens, Administrative Tri'bunals
and The Rules of Evidence.) Likewise' objections to the admission of evidence must be made to the administratiVe board
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and cannot be raised for the first time in a court review.
(State Oompensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Ace.
Oom., 195 Cal. 174, 184 [231 P.996].)
(2) "If the board had improperly refused to entertain
admissible evidence the litigant should not be foreclosed from
offering it at the trial," The liberal rules governing the admission of evidence before administrative bqards make it unlikely that many errors of this sort will occur. In any event
an administrative board should have the opportunity of correcting its own errors by a new hearing in which it can pass
upon the new evidence. If instead, the superior court receives
the evidence it may rest its decision upon it, even though the
Legislature has delegated this responsibility to the administrative board. The superior court acts in its proper capacity
only insofar as it reviews the reeord of the board proceedinR,
but steps out of character to take the place of the board by
examining evidence that has not been presented thereto and
arriving in effect at an administrative determination. (Of
Mojave River Irr. District v.Superior Oourt, 202 Cal. 717,
725-730 [262 P.2d 724].) With respect to many issues it does
not have the specialized background characteristic of administrative officers. "Thus the Commissioner of Corporations
(with, of course, the assistance of his staff) determines
whether a licensed securities broker has sufficient financial
responsibility to carry out the obligations incident to operations as broker, the Insurance Commissioner, whether the investments of a licensed company have beeome insufficiently
liquid to satisfy the demands which in the ordinary course of
events may be made against it; a district board of oil and gas
commissioners, whether there has b~en an unreasonable waste
.of natural gas from producing wells, and if so, to what extent
gas production should be. cut down; the Board of Medical
Examiners; whether an abortion was medically necessary. If
the Legislature had believed that such matters in connection
with license revocation or other regulation would have been
handled better by our Superior Courts, the .latter would presumably have been entrusted with them." (Turrentine, The
Laisne Case-A Strange Chapter in Our Jurisprudence, 17
State Bar Journal 165, 168.) In any event the courts are
already so overburdened with their own work that they may
well be -driven to avoid undertaking administrative investiga.tiona either by denying the alternative or peremptory writ of •
mandamus or remanding the cases to the administrative
bo~rds.
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(3) "If additional evidence not included in. either cat~Bory
«1) or (2) above) be sought to be introduced bya party, the
court has the right to receive it upon a showing that; in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, it could not have been introduced before the board." The majority opinion herEr borrows
from the procedure governing a rUling on a motion for new
trial. Section 657 of the Code. of Civil Procedure' provides
that a new trial may be granted because of "Newlydiscovered evidence, material for the party making the application,
which he could not, witl;1 reasonable diligence; have discovered and produced at the triaL" Presurnably superior courts
will supplement the new system by followingqther traditional
rules with respect to motions for new trial, namely, that motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evi~
dence are looked upon with distrust (Smith v. Schwartz, 14
Cal.App.2d 160 [57 P.2d 1386], and cases there cited), .and
that such evidence must not be merely cumulative, but mllst.
satisfy the court that had it been introduced at the previoui1!
trial the verdict might have been different. (Brannock v.
Bromley, 30 Cal.App.2d 516 [86 P.2d 1062J ; see 20Ca1.Jur.
90-99; McBairie, Oases on Trial Practice, 639-647; lIajn/l on
.New Trial and Appeal, Rev. ed., p. 408.) Presumably also
the appellate courts will follow established precedents in this
field allowing the superior court judge a wide disr.retionary
power in granting or denying a new trial on the ground o~
newly discovered evidence. (See Oooper v. Kellogg, 2 C81.2d
504 [42 P.2d 59], and cases there cited.) While the majority
opinion speaks of the court's right to receive the evidence,
it makes no reference to any correlative right of the partIes to
introduce it, and this silence is consistent with its emphasis
elsewhere on the power of the trial court to grant' or deny
the writ in its discretion.
'
,
It is clear that evidence at least cannot be delibel:'ately with~
held. "If the record before the board should. disclos~ thlitthe
pedtioner had intentionally presented a 'skeleton' defense 'in
the hearing before the board for the obViouspurpos~ Of transferring the controversy from the boar<l to .the court; that· fact
should weigh heavily against him in his endeavorto invoke
the equity powers of the court hi: his behalf in the mandamus
proceeding. "The very effort to circumvent a bona: fide administrativehearing would militate against the possibility of
favorable judicial action. The majority opinion thus goes far
to allay the fears engendered by the Laisne case that an admin-

.
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istrative hearing would be reduced to "something in: tl1.e
n.ature 6f an inquest, or at most, to something like a preliminary hearing in a criminal proce'eding where the administrative ageney will expose its entire case and th~ license~ will
save his evidence for the Court." (Attorney GenQral's Petition for Rehearing in Laisn~ Case, p. 53.) With so much
ground regained it is difficult to 'understand why the administra tive board should stilI' not be the first to weigh the new
evidence. Iu motions for new trial not only does the trial
judge who hears the evidence h""ve wide discretion in passing
upon the motion, but his rulin~ is rarely di1lturbed, . since. he
is 'the one ,best qualified to determine whether there might
have been a different result had the newly discovered evidence been disclos'ed. Similarly, the administrative board,
.conversant With the evidence it has already received on a
matter within its special province, is uniquely qualified to
receive the new evidence and integrate it with the old. There
it! wisdom in the rule that administrative remediEl{'! be.exhausted. before resort· to the courts,and it is not consonant
with such a rule to' alIow. evidence to be presented to the
superior court that has not been presented to the administrative. board. The specialized knowledge and experience of the
board, enables it to make an effective preliminary inqUiry
into technical problems outside the ken of m{)st judges.Without this canalization, of technical problems they would soon
flood the courts; .diverting them from other pressing tasks.
As it is, many of these problems are resolved expeditiously
by administrative determinations so that judicial review
never becomes necessary. When new evidence emerges, it is
as a new piece of a pattern familiar to the board whose considerationthereof may make resort to the courts unnecessary.
(Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280 [109
P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715].)
(4) "If the credibility of witnesses before the board be
brought in question in the mandamus proceeding the opportunityshould be afforded for further examination in order to
contradictor impeach their testimony under well recognized
rules of evidence and procedure." If the new system here
followed the procedure on motion for new trial, newly dis~ov
ered evidence designed merely to impeach or <lont1'l1dict a witness would not be admitted. (See cases cited in 20 Cal.Jur.
98.) Even if it departs from the procedure for motion for
new trial superior court judges in all likelihood· will 'not go
far afield from familiar landmarks, given their discretionary

power, which the majority opinion emphasizes. It would in
any event often be difficult to locate Witnesses who testified
at a!boiU'd meeting. If a witness is not available for the court
prOceeding he cannot be impeached by preVious inconsistent
statements, for under section 2052 of the Code of Ci~ Pro~
cedure "the statements must be related to him, with:thecltcU~tai:i.ces of times, places, and persons present, and hexntiSt
be aakedwhether he made such statements, .and.if 'allowed'·
to explain' them. If the statements be in writing, they
be sh,own to the witness before any question is· p:ut to'hlin.
concernmg them." (People v. Compton, ~32 CaL :t84 [64~.,
849] ; see Hale, lmpecwkment of Witness bt/ Prf,or.-IncOnsi8.:
tent Statements, 10 So.Cal.L.Rev. 135.) 'His testin1onyt1i~re
fore apparently remains.in the record. Once'agairi;i{'1iU
error has arisen in an administrative .h~aring,thQ. a<iin:mlS·trative board should be given an opportunity to c6rtect .tij~t
error.
'
The majority opinion is for them~t' part a retracjil,g of
the way back from the concept of a trial de novo thatnev,el'
materialized. It stops short of a complete retreat to reView by
certiorari of administrative decisions, by a guar4ed permission of new evidence in th~ court proceeding in, , rare circumstances, together with a provision that the superiorcouriforln
an independent judgment on all the evidence. The attendant,
qualification that "the findings ofihe board come,b~fore ~e
court with a strong presumption of their correctness" !!niggests
·that the distinction between the new sy~tem and old may be
more artificial than real.
. .
The majority opinion cites two Texas cases in support of
its statement that trial de novo is not always to be t8.ken
lite,rally. The Texas courts, however, were not engaged in re'defining a requirement of trial de novo made..by themselves
nor were they inquiring into the scope of review und~r man:
?ll.mus or any other con;mon-law 'writ. They were inteJ,'pre~
mg'statlltes that prescrIbed statutory modes of review <lOn~
ceding that the Texas Legislatur,e has power to prescribe the
mode and extent of court review of the decisions of fJ.1e:xas
administrative agencies. In Skup~e v. Railroad Commission'
of TeXas; 123 Tex. 521 [73S.W;2d505], thestatute.provid.ed
for'reVi¢w of any decision of the Railroad CoDlll:lUlaion l'efus·~~g ~o. gran~ a cer~ifi~ate of convenience and necessity,. by
petItIon" IIi a dIstrIct court comparable to the 'superiOr
court in California. The statute. provided, "Said action sluill
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be tried anddete~:rnilled as other civil causes in that court."

The Supreme Court of Texas thought that the Legislature in
granting powers to the commission did not intend that t~e
court should substitute its judgment for that of the .commiSsion, and adopted by quotation from Corpus Juris the rule
that the court should not disturb the findings of the commission if they are supported by substantial evidence. Under its
holdinO'
that the court could not reweigh the evidence the.
.
review had the same scope as certiorari review in this state.
In Texas Liqtlor Oontrol Board v. Floyd, (Te,x~Civ.App.)
117 S.W.2d 530, review of the Board's determinations was 1:IY
statuory "appeal" to a district court. The statute provided
that in the proceeding on this appeal, "the trial shall be de
novo under the same rules as ordinary civil suits." The inconsistency of the statute in characterizing the court review
as both an appeal and a trial de novo has led the Texas courts
to interpret this statute as not intending. that the court should
substitute its judgment for that of the commission. The Court
of Civil Appeals, purporting to follow earlier decisions under
the same statute, said, "As we view the law in such cases as
this, the district court may not hear testimony which
was not
.
produced before the Board or its Administrator and. determine
even from a preponderance thereof, whether or nota dealer's
license shall be cancelled. The court has not the power to sub..
stitute its judgment for that of the Board unless it app~ar~
that there was no testimony of probative and substantial eff~et
before the Board to. support its judgment and decree, or that
the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in cancelling the
license." (Ibid., 534.) Again the holding is that the review
intended by the Legislature has the scope of certiorari review.
The majority of the court seek in these Texas decisions a
justification for redefining the requirement of their own
making that review o£ the decisions of state agencies in Cali~
forniil. must beby trial de novo. Confronted as they are, however, by the decision in Standard Oil 00. of Oalifornia, v.
State Board o/Equalization, 6 Cal.2d 557 [59 P.2d 119], thl:l,t
certiorari review cannot be accorded such agencies, they ~t9l>
short of following the Texas decisions to the end. Instead they:
redefine their novel conception of mandamus as a substitute
for certiorari. They also redefine the trial de novo as so~e
thing so close to certiorari review that it is difficult to dis~
tinguish· one from the other. The present confusion .can be
ended only by an outright abandonment of the decision in the
~

'iIi
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Standard Oil Company case, and a return to the earlier deci~
sio:fJ.swhich that case over-ruled. Stare decisis Is weakfup..
port for a decision that disregarded it. .
,
The difficulties the court has experienced since the &.tandard Oil Company case arise from the abstraction that "Jud~~
cial functions" cannot constitutionally'be vested in adminill.trative ofiJ.cers and boards exercising state-wide authority. In
the early days of the state, the Practice Act of 1851,se!!tion
456, defined certiorari as including review of the decisions of
a "board, or officer, exercising judicial functions." It obviously recognized that some boards and officers exercise U judi:
cial functions." Section 456 was merely a restatement of the
. common-law scope of certiorari (see Goodnow, The Writ of
Oertiorari, 6 PoI.Sci.Quart. ,493), and was reprqduced in section 1068 of the Code· of Civil Procedure of 1872. UndQubtedly the provisions of the Constitutioh of 1879. authorizing
the superior and appellate courts to issue writs of. certiorari
meant certiorari as then defined.
,
Disregarding the historical uses of the writ l1nd theimplications of section 456 of the Practice Act, this court .in 1856
in People v. Hester, 6 Cal. 679, held that a decision of a board
of.county supervisors was not reviewablehy certjorari, on the
ground that the separation of pOWers principle of article III
of the Constitution of 1849 forbade vesting "judicial functions" in a board that also possessed legislativ~ and executive
functions, and that none of the functions of the board could .
,therefore be regarded as judicial. Chief Justice Murray said,
"Naw the Rupervi'3ors, not being judicial officers, or charged
with the exercise of judicial duties, it results that the writ
cannot he directly properly to them. "
The opinion in the Standard Oil Company case, eighty
years later, employs the same reasoning with respect to boards
exercising state-wide powers, although People v. Hester was
overruled the year after it was decided, in People v. Supervisors of El Dorado Oounty, 8 Cal. 58. Chief Justice Murray,
contessing error,said that the functions of boards and supervlkors. had always been" various and manifold j sometimes
judicial," smd that the principle of separation of·powers was
not intended to forbid the practice of vesting varied powers
in such boards. Since then this court has recognized in numer,ous decisions that a great variety of local officers and boards
exercise "judicial functions" in the sense. of certiorari re.view~· (See Elliott, Oertiorari and the LocaZ Board, 29 Cal.L.
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Re\,. 586.) The c()urt baa distinguished the "judicial functions" ,of' administrative boards from their'legislative, executive, minist~rial, and purely discretionary functions.T?e
trend of the decisions has been to regard a board as exerCISing "judicial functions" when' discharging a du..ty to determine property or other legal rights in acCord Wlth law and
the evidence taken at a hearing. There is no longer any doubt
that local boards may constitutionally he vested With author-,
ity to make first instance decisions of questioIlSof law and
issues of fact. (Laisne v. State Board of Optometry, supra,
at 84:7 j WaZker v. Oity of San GabrieZ,20 Ca1.2d 879, [~29
P.2d 349].) The function of the courts has been toreVlew
their' proceedings' by certiorari and set aside their decisions
on points of law if erroneous and on, questions ~f fact if there
was no substantial evidence to support the findmgs.
In, recent decisions p. majority of this court have said that
state boards cannot constitutionally be given "judicial functions." They did not, however, carry their reasoning to the
'logical conclusion that, all the statutes creating state boards
with' fact-finding powers were invalid, and that the boards
themselves were illegaL They only went s6 far as to hold that
the functions of the boards could not be regarded as judicial,
within the rule that certiorari lieS to review the determinations
of boards and officers "exercising judicial functions." Nevertheles!!, the premise of this conclusion was that even power to
determine in the first instance rights 01 property and other
legal rights could not constitutionally be ~ested '~ state
boards. ,In the Drummey case the, court predIcated thIS doc'trine on the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 'Phis was manifest error because the Supreme
Court of the United States has long held that the require, ment of due process is not infringed by vesting such power
in administrative boards. (United States v. Ju Toy, 198
253 [25 S.Ct. 644,49 L.Ed. .1040] ; and many other deci~
sions c;ted in the dissenting opinion in the Laisne case~) This
court seems not to have noted that if due process of law was
denied when the state vested 'Snch power in state boards, it
was also denied when the state vested snch power in local
boards.
, Later a majority of this court found the source of the
unconstitntionality of vesting 'c judicial functions"in state
boards in the judiciarY clause ot the California Constitution.
(Art. VI; sec. 1; Laisne v. State Board of Opt~et:y., supra.)
The reasoning was that this clause vests all the JUdICIal power

u.s.

of the s~ate in the courts created by the Constitution,except
that WhICh may be vested by the Legislature in local" il1fenor
courts, " which it is authorized to establish. The raiio:ti81mi~
tion for vesting "judicial functions" in local boards i~, that
they are' 'inferior courts" established by the Legislature Under
~he authority given in article VI. That aUthority,h9weyer,
, IS for the establishment of local "courtS"
, not,16cruadnrlms.
trative bO,ards. If indeed they are courts it is r~inarka:bie
that the Legislature may vest in them a val'iety of other
powers not judicial, Although article III of the Constitution
of ~heUnited States requires that the, judicial power of' the
natIonalgoyernment be, vested in the courts therein named'
Congress, with the approval of the Supreme Court, •has vesi~d
, 'judicial ,functions" in nUmerous federal" adiniuistratfve
agenc~es.. To explain why Congres~ has this POWer,'and.:the
,state LegIslature does not, a majority of this'c(jui-t stated that
~u ,the fe~eral' agen<:ies are "inferior CQurts;" which' OQIl-gtess
IS anthorIZed by artIcle III to establiSh; They Ov~rlooked that
the tenure Of the personnel of these agencies has 'rievet:'be'~ri
the tenure that article III requires for judges, of courts'authorized by it.
'
',,"
"
, It is a false premise that requires such. ra,tiori8.li~ation. :Th.e
Snpreme Court of the United States 'long ago re¢b~zed Uiat
some powers of courts are exclUsively judicial' \Vhil~' others
are of a. n~ture. that the~ may be exercised eltp~rpy'~ourts or
by admmlStratno:e. agenCIes, and that, administl'ati'V'e ageiicies
haveaJ,ways exerCIsed sonie pOwers identic.81' i\i.ith the pow~rs
of thecourtB. ,As early as 1855 in Murray vo H6b(jken tand'
& Imp. O()'., 18 How. 272 [15 L.Ed. 372], the 'co1u-t'h~idvaiid
an act of 1820 authorizing administrative officers in the Tteasuryto determine the existence and arriountotdelinqu~ncYin
the accounts of revenue collectors and to isSue distl'ess'
rants on their property to enforce collection. The ~burt.heid
t?at there was no denial of due process of ~aw and no viola'"
hon of the judi<liary article of the Constitution. The cou'rt
declared 'c That the auditing of the accounts ola receivel' of'
publicmone~ may be, in an enlarged sense, a judici81 act,
must be admItted. So are' all those administrative duties the
performance of which involves an inquiry into the eXisteh~~
of' facts and the application to them of rules of law. ' .. : We
'do not doubt the power of Congress to provide by laW-that
such a question shall form the subject-matter of a sUit in
which the judicial power can be exerted; The Acto£ 1820
,

'
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makes such a provision for reviewing the decision of the ac~
coUnting officers of the treasury. But until reviewed, it is
final and binding j and the question is, whether its subjectmatter is n:ecessarily,and without regard to the consent of
Congress, a judicial controversy. And we are of the o~inion
it is not." It may be noted that this familiar decision with
its interpretation of a judiciary clause of a constitution was
made a quarter of a century before, the adoption of the pres'
ent Constitution of California.
This doctrine was clearly explained by Chief Justice Hughes
in Crowell v. Benson, 285' U.S.' 22 [52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed.
598]. The question there was whether Congress could vest
in an administrative officer the adjudication of claimS brought
by employees agaInst employers for compensation arising
under a workmen's compensation law enacted by Congress.
The court held that the statute was valid, and that thedccisions of the administrative officer on all ordinary issues of
fact were firJal if supported by substantial evidence. Thus
the judicial review authorized under the statute, while not
expressly called certiorari review, has the scope of the review
afforded by that writ. The court recognized' that the st,atute
authorized the administrative officer to determine "the liability of one individual to another" (p. 31), a function often
given courts. It said that the statute empowered the officer
to determine "questions of, fact as to the circumstt1Ilces, nature, extent and consequences of the injuries sustained by the
employee." (P. 54.) Yet the court found no objection to
vesting these "judicial functions" in the administrative officer. It said "the reservation of full authority to the (reviewing) court to deal with matters of law provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function in this class of
calles." (P. 54.) Concluding this phase of the case Chief
Justice Hughes said: "For the purposes stated, we. are unable to find any constitutional obstac,le to the action of the
Congress in availing itself of a method shown by eXperien<!e
to be eS!jelitial in order to apply its standards to the thousands
of cases in'Vol'Ved, thus relieving the courts of a most serious
burden while preserving their complete authority to insuro
the, proper application of the law." On this point all the
justices were in agreemeIl,t.
There waS a second point on which they wer,e divided. The
majority held that there were two issues of fact that might
arise in ail. adjudication of claims under the statute, to which
a diffel'entrule applied. They held that where it was con-
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tended that' the place where the accident occurred was not
na~gable waters, or that the claimant was, not an eIliployec
of the defendant when the injury was incurred, the essential
p~wers of the courts could be preserved only in,the'reviewing
court were to give a trial de 1l0VO on these fact issues; The
reasons given for singling them out were (a) that this statute,
enacted by Congress in exercise of its power to make admiralty
law, could constitutionally apply only to accidents occurring
on navigable waters, and (b) that Congress could'not apply
the principle of compensation for injuries where they occpt-ted without fault of the defendant, unless an employment,
relation or'comparable relation existed between 'the claimant
and the defendant. On this requirement of trial de novo of
the, two excepted issues, Justices Brandeis, Stone, aildRoberts
diSSented. In the course of his opinion on the second point,
Chief ,Justice Hughes phrased the new doctrine as if it were
a general rule that in all cases where a constitutional right
dep el1ds upon the decision of an issue of fact there milstbe a'
trial de noyo in a court on that issue." (See pp. 56, 60.) This
no'Vel doctrine was not expanded by the Supreme Court into
a i"enerf!.l rule (see McGovney,op. cit. 29Cal.L.Rev.1l0, 125-,
129, 138-142), but even jf it had been it would have no appli,cation to a case like Drttmmey v. State Board of Funeral Di• r,ectors, supra; Nevertheless this court cited Crowell v. Benson
in support of its holding that the fact issues decided by the
board must be independently redetermined by a court, even
though there was no issue of constitutional right in that case.
Dru:rnfuey did not question the constitutionality of the statute'
his license was suspended by the board under a statute ad:
mittedlyvalid, and the only issue of fact was whether he'had
done any act that was a ground for suspension under the
statute. Nor was any issue of constitutional right raised either
in the ;Laisne case or in the present case. If the petitioner
advertised in a manner forbidden by a valid statute he can~ot claim. th~t any constitutional right is violated by suspensI~n .of hIS lIcense. A comparable problem is presented by a
crImmal statute that defines the act constituting a crime. If
the statute is constitutional, the issue of fact whether the
accused committed the prohibited act raises no constitutional
issue. Yet the inajority opinion in this case still clings to the
statement that the new rule is founded on the protection of
"a constitutional right either of liberty or property."
In the present case the question is the scope of judicial
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review of a decision of an adminIstrative board author,ized
to adjudicate issues of fact arising in the applicationQ:f a
valid statute. Had Dare questioned the validity of the, statute
and the board had ruled against him, he could have had the
decision set a'side by certiorari if the reviewing court, con~
chided that the statute was invalid. Whatever were the early,
limitationsJn England on the issues open on certiorari, the
courts of thi" country long ago held that on certiorari the rcviewing court can Set aside an administrative decision based
upon an error of law. (A leading case to this effect is People
v. Sm~'th, 45 N.Y. 772, decided in 1871; see Goodnow,op dt~ ,
6 Pol. Sci. Quart., 493.) That rule was embodied in ~ection
462 of the Practice Act of 1851 and in section 1074 of the
Code of Civil Procedure of1872 byihe provision that the reo
viewing court may ' i determine whether the inferior tribunal,
Board, ,or officer has regularly pursued, the authority of such
tribunal, Board or officer." It ,should also be observed that
if a board follows an unconstitutional procedure, or fails to'
follow a procedure prescribed by' statute, its decision may be
set aside on certiorari.
,
The, recent decisions requiring trial de nOvo of the ,findings
of administrative agencies exercising state-wide power have
assumed that for various reasons it is unconstitutional in this
state to vest "judicial functions" in such agimeies, ailthis to
a single result, the prevention of review of th~ir d~cision~ by
writ of certiorari. Do the functions of these agencies cease'to
be "judicial" whentheir decisIons are reviewable by the ;inajority's newly, qualifi~d trial de novol Hasnbt the maj~rity
opinion 'by its very quhlifica~ionsof trial de n<>vo, d,escribed,
in the first part of this op4iion, belied its oW:Ilcontentiori that
it· is, unconstitutional to authorize su~h, boards to make ,first
instan<ie decisions on questions of law ,and' iss'uesof fact Y
I concur in the judgment insofar as it holds that i,t was
proper for, the trial court, ,to deny the aiternativewitof
mandamus. I dissent. OIl the gro~nd that Standard. 0",7, O'o.y.
StatelJoard 01 Eqt~aUzation,$1£pra, should be overruled and
that tbe present decision should be wit.hout prejudice to the
right of the petitioner to apply for certiorari.
Gibson, C., J., and Edmonds; J., concurred.
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NORMAN :RUSSELL,Respondent, ,Yo ALLEN MIL;l;JER,ai
Registr~r'of Contractors, etc.,et,at, Appelllihts: ,.:
[1] Administrative Law-MandaJlius--Trial,De Nov~E'ridence

Record ofEVldence ..,.;.,In a m.andamus pi'o'Cej!dpj.~,t6: re~iew'
the a.ction ,0£' theContrltC~or;s;State Lice,W!,e~oai:,df it)15 'error
to strikEr the record of the oral eyideri¢e before the board
whicn had been introduced in eVidence. '
,
[2] Id.......Manda~us--Appell.l..,..HarD.lles8 and Rever,sible, EiTor-,
'Strildng 'Evidence.---:+ln' a'In~Iidarii1l.~ 'proceeding. tQ'r&rlew' the,
evidence of an administrative board, error in '8t~ihg the te~
ord of oral., evidence "before., the 'board,' was hannless where
evidence ii;l.troducedas ill, an Unlimited. trial ~le ~Qvo supported 'the findings 'an~ju4gment, and this, 'despitllthe 'f~~~
that the, petitioner's teatim,ony before the board was more
detaIled than in the' trial court.
'

APPEAL from a judgment of the, Supe:dor qourt of ,the
(Jitya:nd County of San Francisco. Frank T; 1)easi, Jlldg~.
Affirfued.
' '
,'

"

Proceeding in mandamus to require' the' nonenforcement of ,"

ther~voeati()n 'ofa contractor's license :and th~ diSfui.~al Qt

the' di$(lip1iriaryproceeding~ Judgmerit directing restbi'ation;
'
,

,ot licetise ,affirnied.
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Eai'lWarren; Attorney General, Lucas· E.-Kilkenny,:, J.
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Geary, & Geary, C. J. Tauzer; Bradford, :M. ~Melvin, Dat-;
win'Bryan,and,CharlesJ: Wiseman ,for Respondent.
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SHENK, ' J:......Thepetiti~p.er:file.4· in" the, sup~t;i.o,:t:cou.rta'
petiti'on for.' a writ of , mandate" dii'ectilig ithe:f;l'eSpondents;
C(jntrMto~'Siate, License Board, itsmembe,ril f$d,itsre.giS~,
trar, ,torefrain:fr()tnenfor~ing th,ere-v;ocation' of ,:th~, petit~oil~;
er~s license '~ an eIEl<itridal'~ci6ritractOr, and to disridss the
complaintperiding before" the bda;rd., The responderi~ have'
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